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PROJECT COMMENTS
A COURT DIVIDED: AN ANALYSIS OF POLARIZATION
ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN THE
OCTOBER 1957 TERM
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court entered the October
1957 Term encountering waves of protest from Congress, the
press, and the internal membership of the Court itself.' The
docket contained many issues that had divided the Court in the
past and brought it under attack. Issues such as loyalty oaths,
segregation, criminal procedure, and states' rights were ripe
amid the public's clamor to curb the Court. Nevertheless, the
Court heard arguments and disposed of by opinion the largest
number of cases since Chief Justice Earl Warren had come on
the bench in 1953.2
This comment is a companion to Professor Galloway's arti-
cle on the second period of the Warren Court (1957-61).:' His
thesis is that a resurgence of judicial conservatism occurred
late in the October 1957 Term.4 This Term also showed the
highest level of disagreement in the entire sixteen years of the
Warren Court.5 The Court was highly polarized.' Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Black and Douglas formed a liberal bloc.
Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and Harlan comprised the con-
servative faction. Justice Whittaker tended to side with the
conservatives. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, usually
sided with the liberals. Justice Clark held a swing position,
often casting the deciding vote in important cases.7
© 1979 by Stephen D. Pahl.
1. A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFrt TO WARREN 4 (1958).
2. Brown, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARV. L. REV. 77, 104-05 (1958).
3. Galloway, The Second Period of the Warren Court: The Liberal Trend Abates
(1957-1961), 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 947 (1979).
4. Hereinafter, whenever a Supreme Court Term is referred to by year, it is
assumed to be the October Term of that year. Thus, the reference to the 1957 Term
means the October 1957 Term that extended into the first six months of 1958.
5. Galloway, supra note 3, at 957.
6. Although Professor Galloway's entire analysis of the 1957 Term shows this
polarization, it is perhaps most evident when one considers that the average dissents
per decision (2.2) was the second highest in the entire history of the Court. Galloway,
supra note 3, at 952.
7. The examples of Justice Clark's deciding vote are numerous throughout the
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In light of this polarization, it is of interest to determine
1) which substantive areas produced high or low polarization,
and 2) how the individual Justices voted in those areas. Al-
though voting patterns and "bloc analysis" are helpful in sum-
marizing vast amounts of information, one must assess deci-
sions in particular substantive areas to fully understand the
legal developments and trends produced by the Court. This
comment will focus on the issues involved and the positions
held by the Justices. It will present the main themes of the
decisions rendered and attempt to paint a judicial portrait of
the Supreme Court in the 1957 Term.
Initially, an overview of the Term will be presented by
looking at separate categories of cases, observing whether there
were voting blocs and, if so, what alignment of particular Jus-
tices occurred. This will be followed by a substantive analysis
of loyalty oath/subversion and race discrimination to illustrate
how the Justices and their "blocs" interacted in individual
decisions.
METHODOLOGY
The research methodology utilized for this project involved
a compilation of all decisions rendered on the merits by the
Supreme Court in the 1957 Term in which a formal opinion was
prepared and credited to a Justice.' These decisions were clas-
sified into the following ten categories: Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC); administrative law (except ICC, labor, and
tax); admiralty and railroads; business regulation and federal
agencies (except ICC); citizenship and aliens; constitutional
law; criminal procedure; jurisdiction and procedure; labor rela-
tions; and tax.' Each category contained between five and
twelve decisions, the exceptions being criminal procedure and
1957 Term. Some of the more noteworthy cases include: Lambert v. California, 355
U.S. 225 (1957); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958); Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S.
390 (1958); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); and Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468
(1958). See Comment, Justices Stewart and Clark: Swing Votes on the Warren Court,
19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1009 (1979).
8. Thus the following cases were not considered: cases in which certiorari was
denied; cases that were summarily decided by the Court; and per curiam decisions,
including those with opinions. In order to maintain the uniformity of data used in the
Supreme Court History Project articles, both divided and unanimous decisions are
included.
9. A complete list of the 1957 Term's decisions used in this project are classified
by the above categories and are set forth in app. A.
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constitutional law with twenty-one and twenty decisions re-
spectively.
Some decisions in the 1957 Term were so multi-faceted
that they could logically fit into more than one category.'" In
those cases, an extra effort was made to isolate the most impor-
tant issue resolved in the decision and categorize it accord-
ingly.
After each decision in the Term was classified, the cases
were analyzed on the basis of voting polarization." This ena-
bled consideration of whether the Court's high disagreement
rate in 1957 extended over the entire spectrum of decisions or
whether it was confined to a few highly controversial areas.
POLARIZATION ON THE ISSUES
Almost every decision of importance during the Term saw
sharp disagreement among the Justices. Dissent rates were
unusually high." Of the 104 decisions rendered with assigned
opinions, fifty-seven, showed polarization between the voting
blocs. 3 By investigating the areas of high polarization, it can
be determined whether the Justices' basic ideologies differed or
whether the high disagreement rate was concentrated in just a
few controversial areas. The categories are presented in de-
scending order of their degree of polarization.
Citizenship and Aliens
This was the most polarized category in the 1957 Term. A
majority of these decisions involved loyalty oaths. Out of the
twelve cases decided, ten were polarized; seven of those were
decided five-to-four.
The most significant decision in this category was Kent v.
10. The most appropriate examples are those decisions that deal with tax, citi-
zenship and aliens, or criminal procedure that overlapped into the area of constitu-
tional law.
11. Voting polarization occurred whenever one of the following groups dissented
in a decision: at least two of the three core liberal members (Warren, Black, or Doug-
las); or both core conservatives (Frankfurter and Harlan); or one core conservative with
Burton and Whittaker, who were considered moderate conservatives.
12. Galloway, supra note 3, at 950. The average dissent rate in the 1957 Term
was 2.2 dissents per nine votes. The only other Warren Court Terms when the aver-
age dissent rate climbed to more than two dissents per case were the 1959 and 1960
Terms.
13. The requirements for a decision to be considered polarized are set forth in
note 11 supra.
1979] 987
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Dulles'4 and its companion case, Dayton v. Dulles. 15 The Court
held that the Secretary of State was without authority to deny
passports to persons refusing to sign anti-Communist affidavits
or to deny passports to Communists traveling abroad. Civil
liberties gained greater protection in Trop v. Dulles. 11 The Jus-
tices split five-to-four with Justice Whittaker joining the liber-
als to reverse the denaturalization of a citizen for desertion
from the Army. The majority based their ruling on the determi-
nation that such punishment was cruel and unusual and there-
fore, in violation of the eighth amendment. Justices Frank-
furter, Burton, Clark and Harlan joined in dissent on the
theory that the executive branch requires broad authority to
protect national security.
Labor Relations
Labor unions did not fare too well during the Term; they
lost several important decisions, some by close votes. Polariza-
tion was well above average; six of eight decisions were polar-
ized. The margin by which many of the close cases were de-
cided is indicated by a 75% polarization rate and the number
of split decisions. While only one case involved a five-four split,
five decisions had three dissenters, usually Warren, Black and
Douglas. A fairly representative labor decision in the Term was
that of Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc.'7 The Court upheld the right
of a state to restrict mass picketing by strikers where there was
a high probability of violence. Warren, Black and Douglas dis-
sented on the ground that the National Labor Relations Board
had exclusive jurisdiction over the strike and its effects. But
the Justices did not divide on all the issues presented to them
regarding unions; they unanimously upheld the right of black
union members to sue their union for following discriminatory
practices.18
Criminal Procedure
Only a few years before the criminal procedure revolution
of the 1960's, the Court dealt with a large number of cases in
this area. Of the twenty-one decisions rendered, thirteen were
14. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
15. 357 U.S. 144 (1958).
16. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
17. 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
18. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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polarized; and nine of those were determined by a five-to-four
vote. Two or more dissents were recorded in eighteen of the
twenty-one cases. The Justices found themselves divided on
most major issues in the area, especially those involving consti-
tutional safeguards. The swing vote of Justice Clark provided
the Frankfurter/Harlan bloc with the extra vote necessary to
prevail in most of the close decisions."
The difference in basic ideologies was well represented by
Crooker v. California.2° Justice Clark delivered the opinion,
finding no denial of due process where police refused defen-
dant's request for assistance of counsel during questioning.
Justice Douglas, dissenting on behalf of the liberal bloc,
stressed that the denial of counsel violated the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause." The Court's decision in
Benanti v. United States"2 is of particular interest since it
unanimously held that a federal court could not admit wiretap
evidence obtained by state police acting under a valid state
statute. A high incidence of agreement, however, was the ex-
ception rather than the norm in this volatile area.
Business Regulation
Trade and economic regulation is an area that has tradi-
tionally divided the conservative and liberal members of the
Court, and the 1957 Term was no exception. Antitrust matters
constituted a majority of the cases in this area. The liberal
Justices (Warren, Black, Douglas and Brennan) favored a
broad reading of the antitrust laws, while the core conservative
faction (Frankfurter, Burton and Harlan) stood in opposition
in each case. Thus Justices Clark or Whittaker usually deter-
mined the majority depending on the bloc that they joined. In
the Term, six of the ten cases were polarized. This is slightly
above the average polarization rate for the entire Term (55%).
The only noteworthy decision rendered was Federal Trade
Commission v. Standard Oil Co. 2 This decision concluded a
seventeen-year-old lawsuit in which Standard Oil was claimed
to have maintained a dual pricing system discriminating
among dealers. The Commission lost, four liberals dissenting.
19. Of the thirteen polarized decisions, the liberal bloc prevailed only live times;
the conservatives prevailed in the other eight cases.
20. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
21. Id. at 447-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
22. 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
23. 355 U.S. 396 (1958).
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Constitutional Law
Categorizing the decisions involving constitutional law is
always difficult since many of the issues spill over into other
subject areas. However, twenty decisions were placed in the
category and exactly half were polarized. Many decisions
showed high agreement rates; seven decisions in the area had
only one dissenting vote cast or were unanimously decided.
Several of the cases are examined in detail below in the section
that deals with loyalty oaths/subversion and race discrimina-
tion.
Administrative Law and Interstate Commerce Commission
Major polarized decisions were not confined to areas where
public criticism of the Court was high. In Public Service Com-
mission of Utah v. United States,4 the Court, speaking through
Justice Clark, reversed, for lack of substantial evidence, the
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission raising freight
rates fifteen percent. Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Harlan and
Whittaker dissented, arguing that requiring the additional evi-
dence was inconsistent with the Interstate Commerce Act and
that the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction to set the
rates. 5 Only two of the six cases in both the ICC and adminis-
trative law categories were polarized.
Admiralty and Railroads
In matters regarding admiralty and railroads, only five
decisions were rendered by the Court; three were polarized. All
involved on-the-job injuries and the procedural problems in
seeking compensation for them. Most of the holdings appeared
to be limited to the facts presented in the particular dispute.
Other Categories
In the tax category there was little polarization. Seven of
the nine decisions rendered had two or fewer dissenters. In
jurisdiction and procedure (involving such issues as states'
rights 6 and pre-trial discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 7), the Court was sharply divided. However, none of
24. 356 U.S. 421 (1958).
25. Id. at 429 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
26. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
27. See, e.g., Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Corn-
[Vol. 19
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these categories produced an overall pattern but rather con-
tained a hodgepodge of cases of a miscellaneous nature.
In conclusion, the highest polarization rates occurred in
those sensitive areas where public criticism of the Court was
greatest. In matters related to citizenship and aliens (where
most of the loyalty oath decisions appear), ten of the twelve
cases were decided by a polarized vote. Similarly, the volatile
criminal procedure area was also highly polarized. On the other
hand, only half of the constitutional law decisions showed div-
ided voting blocs-somewhat less than expected. And, in labor
relations, three-quarters of the decisions were polarized. This
is somewhat more than anticipated, mainly because the War-
ren Court was not considered to be activist in the labor area
during its first decade.
TRENDS IN SUBSTANTIVE AREAS
To form a better understanding of the interactions of the
voting blocs throughout the Term, a closer look at two substan-
tive areas is instructive. The two areas selected are subgroups
of the above categories: loyalty oath/subversion cases and cases
involving Blacks.18 There are two reasons for such an inquiry.
First, one area showed a high polarization rate (loyalty
oaths/subversion-78%) and the other a low disagreement rate
(Blacks-20%). Second, these areas have traditionally been
thought to be areas of emphasis during the first decade of the
Warren Court.
Loyalty Oath/Subversion Cases
The 1957 Term brought no relief to a Supreme Court
caught in a crossfire between the Constitution and the cold-war
mentality. The Court rendered opinions in nine loyalty
oath/subversion cases with seven showing clear polarization."
Furthermore, six were decided by bare five-vote majorities.
The Court did not have one unanimous opinion in this area.'
In the concluding days of the 1956 Term, the Court had a
field day handing down three major decisions gutting Congress'
merciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
28. For example, the cases involving blacks came from areas such as labor rela-
tions, constitutional law and criminal procedure.
29. The test for polarization is set forth in note 11 supra.
30. Six cases were decided by five-to-four majorities, one by six-to-three majority
and two by a seven-to-one majority with Chief Justice Warren not participating.
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anti-subversion programs.' Thereafter, several members of the
House introduced bills to reinstate measures which had been
struck down.3" But in the 1957 Term, the Court responded with
even more "pro-Communist" decisions. Without any doubt,
the most significant of these was Kent v. Dulles,3 where peti-
tioners had applied for a passport but had refused to sign a
non-Communist affidavit. The Secretary of State denied the
application, basing his authority on a 1952 statute 4 which he
asserted gave the State Department authority to deny pass-
ports to those engaged in Communist activities.
The Court based its appellate jurisdiction in Kent and its
companion case, Dayton v. Dulles,35 on dicta in United States
v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. 36 which held that even the exec-
utive's power in the conduct of foreign affairs "must be exer-
cised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Con-
stitution."37 The statute was construed narrowly, the Court
holding that Congress had not delegated authority to the Secre-
tary of State to deny passports to those engaged in Communist
activity. Although not essential to the holdings, the majority
did not bypass the opportunity to declare the fundamental
nature of the right to travel rooted in the fifth amendment."
The dissents in Kent and Dayton were bitter. Justice
Clark, joined by Justices Burton, Harlan and Whittaker,
stressed the executive's need for discretion and power to deny
passports to persons whose activities outside the United States
might be detrimental to its interest, and the clear congressional
intent in the legislation. Finally Justice Clark took a swipe at
the majority for not reaching the constitutional questions pre-
sented by the parties.
These cases involved substantial activism by the Court.
They raised access to passports to the status of a right of citi-
zenship, contrary to prior assumptions that such access was
31. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
32. C. PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT 11 (1961).
33. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952).
35. 357 U.S. 144 (1958). Dayton's application for a passport was denied upon the
Secretary's confidential findings that he associated with members of the Communist
Party and that his mission abroad was for the advancement of that cause. Id.
36. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
37. Id. at 319-20.
38. 357 U.S. at 129-30.
39. Congressional intent to deny passports may be derived from the Internal
Security Act of 1950 §§ 2, 6, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781, 785 (1952).
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merely a governmental privilege. The decision also demon-
strated that the Court would review the executive's power over
foreign affairs whenever a basic liberty of a citizen had been
threatened. On the other hand, the majority refused to reach
the due process thrust of the case. As will be shown, the Court
was to waffle throughout the Term in the areas of loyalty oaths
and subversion.
Another pair of loyalty oath decisions in which the major-
ity failed to reach the substantive constitutional issue were
Speiser v. Randall" and its companion case, First Unitarian
Church v. County of Los Angeles.4' Both cases involved an
amendment to the California Constitution prohibiting the
granting of tax exemptions to any individual or organization
which advocated the violent overthrow of the state or federal
government.2 To implement the amendment, each claimant
was required to sign a loyalty oath on the bottom of his tax
return. Both Speiser and the First Unitarian Church refused to
sign the affidavit and were subsequently denied the tax exemp-
tions normally given to veterans' and church organizations.
The Court by a seven-to-one majority43 overturned the
statute. However, only five Justices agreed with the reasoning
of the majority opinion written by Justice Brennan. They held
that the procedure for determining the eligibility for the ex-
emption was constitutionally defective because the state was
inflicting a penalty without proof of disloyalty. The more im-
portant constitutional issue presented was the substantive
question addressed by Justices Black and Douglas in their con-
curring opinions. The loyalty oath was a restriction on petition-
ers' first amendment rights; hence no procedure could with-
stand constitutional scrutiny.
The decisions in Speiser and First Unitarian Church were
the only two decisions in this sub-area considered non-
polarized. However, only two Justices reached the constitu-
tional question; five based their decision on the procedure, and
one upheld the statute. Therefore, even though the voting was
not formally polarized, a closer analysis reveals major differ-
ences in policy values.
The 1957 Term added two more decisions to the important
40. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
41. 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
42. CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 19 (1953). This section is now located in CAL. CONST.
art. 7, § 9 (1976).
43. Chief Justice Warren did not participate.
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line of cases involving dismissal of public employees for secu-
rity reasons. In Lerner v. Casey" and Beilan v. Board of Public
Education,45 the Court upheld, by five-to-four votes, the dis-
missal of public employees for refusal to answer questions re-
garding membership in the Communist Party. Lerner had been
a subway conductor for New York's transit system and was
fired under New York's Security Risk Law; Beilan was a public
school teacher in Philadelphia and was dismissed on grounds
of incompetency.
The conservative majority explicitly stated that their
holding was not based on the fact that petitioners took the fifth
amendment, as was the case in Slochower v. Board of Higher
Education," nor the inference of possible Communist Party
ties. The major fault with the "transparent denials" of the
majority in both decisions is that they are based upon the
"patent fiction that they are anything but loyalty cases.""
The Court carefully stated that no findings were made as
to Beilan's loyalty and that Konigsberg v. State Bar"5 could be
distinguished in that the dismissal there was based on infer-
ences drawn from a refusal to answer questions and not on the
refusal itself. The majority's reasoning is even more bewilder-
ing since the record showed that the dismissal proceedings
against Beilan began just seven days after he took the fifth
amendment before the House Subcommittee on Un-American
Activities." Certainly, Slochower would seem to apply to the
dismissal. 0 However, the Court relied on a 1951 decision,
Garner v. Board of Public Works,5' that allowed the dismissal
of a public employee based solely on a refusal to answer rele-
vant questions. In the following Term, the Garner rule was
amended in Wieman v. Updegraff2 to provide that refusal to
sign a loyalty oath was not legitimate grounds for dismissal.
44. 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
45. 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
46. 350 U.S. 551 (1956). The Court held that due process prohibits automatic
dismissal of a public teacher merely because he has taken the fifth amendment before
a Senate Subcommittee. Invoking the fifth amendment is insufficient to establish a
conclusive presumption of conduct inconsistent with continued public employment.
Id. at 558-59.
47. Schwartz, The Supreme Court-October 1957 Term, 57 MICH. L. REv. 315,
329 (1959).
48. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
49. 357 U.S. at 424 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. Schwartz, supra note 47, at 329.
51. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
52. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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Was Garner, as amended by Wieman, more applicable than
Slochower in this instance? The Court summarily distin-
guished Slochower since, in that case, the loyalty questions
were asked during a federal investigation that was not an in-
quiry into job fitness. Beilan's dismissal was based on his fit-
ness as a teacher. However, the fact remains that both cases
involved inquiry into a public teacher's loyalty. As one com-
mentator wrote, to hold that Slochower does not govern the
results in this case is "to ignore the realities of the record."'' '15
Clearly the Court ignored the realities of the situation in
applying the law in these cases. Warren, Black, Douglas and
Brennan all wrote dissenting opinions. As Justice Brennan's
dissent emphasizes, a dismissal would result in a
"simultaneous public labeling of the employees as disloyal." 4
There were three other decisions in the 1957 Term concern-
ing the government's anti-subversion programs. In Rowoldt v.
Perfetto,55 the Court held, by a bare majority, that the govern-
ment must show "a meaningful association" before instituting
deportation proceedings against aliens for membership in the
Communist Party. While the liberal majority, joined by Justice
Frankfurter, based their interpretation of the statute on legisla-
tive intent of the Internal Security Act of 1950,56 the dissent
claimed the Court was taking impermissible liberties in read-
ing the statute."
In Brown v. United States,5 8 the Court held that the scope
of the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination
did not extend to federal civil cases where the defendant had
testified. Mrs. Brown, involved in denaturalization proceedings
based on alleged Communist affiliations, voluntarily took the
stand on direct testimony; but she asserted her fifth amend-
ment right to remain silent on cross-examination in the same
subject areas. The majority affirmed her conviction holding
that a defendant who voluntarily takes the stand and offers
testimony on her own behalf has waived the privilege during
53. Schwartz, supra note 47, at 329.
54. 357 U.S. at 418 (Brennan, J., dissenting). When carried to its logical conclu-
sion, such labeling for refusal to answer a loyalty question would seem to clash with
another decision of the Term, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
55. 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
56. Id. at 120. The section of the Internal Security Act that the court construed
is now located in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(28) (1976).
57. 355 U.S. at 122 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
58. 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
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cross-examination to the extent that questions relate to mat-
ters raised by her own testimony on direct examination." The
liberal dissenters pressed the same arguments their counter-
parts had used in Rowoldt: that the majority was needlessly
extending a rule that was constitutionally debatable even in
the criminal area.10 Nevertheless, the Frankfurter/Harlan bloc
prevailed, noting that the defendant had the choice not to take
the stand.
Finally, in an interesting sidelight to the Term, Yates v.
United States' came back to the Court from California. Late
in the 1956 Term, the Court struck down ten of Mrs. Yates'
eleven contempt citations, based on unnecessary multiplica-
tion of offenses for failure to answer questions regarding her
alleged Communist associates. When the Ninth Circuit rein-
stated the one-year sentence originally given, the Court re-
duced her sentence to time served, basing its authority on the
rarely used supervisory power over the administration of jus-
tice. The only difference in the views of the Justices was that
the core liberal bloc would have gone further and dismissed the
last contempt citation."
Although five of the nine decisions in this area in the 1957
Term were apparent victories for critics of the government's
loyalty programs, the dominant pattern was the Court's refusal
to decide the hard issues; instead, the decisions drew distinc-
tions, relied on technicalities and limited the holdings to the
particular facts. However, the core liberal bloc supported basic
freedoms such as the right to travel, to receive tax exemptions,
and not to be deported without sufficient evidence. The con-
servatives practiced judicial self-restraint whenever possible,
and read statutes literally.
Although each member of the Court may cast a vote in a
particular case not in accordance with his usual ideologies, an
understanding of general bloc alignments is still helpful. In the
loyalty oath/subversion area, the polar figures were clear. On
one side were Justices Black and Douglas who favored greater
protections and freedoms for the individual; they were usually
joined by Warren, and often Brennan. At the other end of the
spectrum were Justices Burton, Harlan and Whittaker along
59. Id. at 155-56.
60. Id. at 158 (Black, J., dissenting).
61. 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
62. Id. at 76-79 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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with Justice Clark who, although considered a swing vote in
most areas, consistently supported government anti-subversion
programs.
The goal as well as the problem for each of the blocs was
to gain the badly needed fifth vote, usually Frankfurter's. Per-
haps this is why the reasoning waffled, the denials became
"transparent," and the wordy opinions meant little, often con-
flicting with and confusing past decisions. The adage that hard
cases make bad law was never more clear. What should be
equally clear is that any case decided under great pressure and
stress also has the tendency to make bad law.6" This certainly
was true of the subversion cases in the 1957 Term. The state-
ment once made in dissent by Justice Jackson, "the more...
you explain it, the more I don't understand it," 4 was fully
applicable to the nine splintered, confusing decisions made by
a, tribunal in bitter disagreement.
Racial Discrimination Cases
In terms of public clamor in 1957 and 1958, the race dis-
crimination area was second only to the Court's decisions in the
area of subversion. However, the number of decisions involv-
ing blacks in the 1957 Term was small and the polarization rate
was low. There were only five decisions and three were decided
unanimously. 5
Perhaps the most significant case heard in the 1957 Term
and certainly in the area of race was NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson."6 In that case, Alabama attempted to oust the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
from the state for failure to comply with the registration re-
quirements for foreign corporations. More specifically, the
state demanded that the NAACP produce its membership
list. 7 The NAACP refused to comply and was found in civil
63. Schwartz, supra note 47, at 327. The best modern-day examples of cases
decided under stress tending to "create" bad or uncertain law are: New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); and Bakke v. Regents of the University of
California, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
64. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 214 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
65. Although a number of books and articles have included the Little Rock
desegregation case, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), decided in the 1957 Term, this
comment does not evaluate the decision because it was issued in Special Term, August,
1958.
66. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
67. The Association eventually produced all requested records except for the
membership materials. Id. at 454.
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contempt. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
unanimously held that the fourteenth amendment did not per-
mit Alabama to require membership lists unless the state could
show a compelling need." The Court found that petitioners had
standing based on the claim that enforcement of the Alabama
statute might defeat the members' constitutional right to free-
dom of association.
The Court in the 1957 Term rendered decisions in two
other civil cases dealing with the treatment of blacks, Eubanks
v. Louisiana" and Conley v. Gibson.0 In Eubanks, the Court
unanimously confirmed its earlier decisions that the systematic
exclusion of blacks from juries, whether grand or petit, violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.7' In
Conley, the Court again unanimously upheld the right of black
union members to sue their union for failure to represent them
fairly, equally, and without discrimination." Although decided
by unanimous votes, the decisions were not far-reaching in the
substantive area of the law but were limited to the particular
facts of the cases. 73
Both Payne v. Arkansas74 and Thomas v. Arizona71 con-
cerned the voluntariness of confessions given by black defen-
dants charged with murder. Although the cases were criminal
procedure cases, both involved black petitioners, and the Court
appeared particularly sensitive to this fact in its opinions. 7
Therefore, they are logically included in this analysis.
Chief Justice Warren reiterated the traditional standard of
review regarding coerced confessions as set out in the prior
Term: the totality of the circumstances would be scrutinized
to determine whether the confession was "voluntary. ,77 No bet-
ter case than Payne could have been found for applying this
principle. The defendant was a mentally dull, nineteen-year-
old with a fifth grade education. He was held incommunicado
for three days, denied food, and threatened by the chief of
68. Id. at 466.
69. 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
70. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
71. 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
72. 355 U.S. at 42.
73. Indeed, in Eubanks, Justice Black explicitly warned that the opinion was
limited to the particular facts presented in the case. 356 U.S. at 585.
74. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
75. 356 U.S. 390 (1958).
76. Id. at 393, 356 U.S. at 561.
77. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
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police that "there would be thirty or forty people there in a few
minutes that wanted to get him unless he talked." Justice
Whittaker, speaking for a majority of seven, reversed the con-
viction stating: "It seems obvious from the totality of this
course of conduct and particularly the culminating threat of
mob violence, that the confession was coerced and did not con-
stitute an 'expression of free choice'."7 Justices Burton and
Clark dissented, finding that even if the confession was
coerced, there was sufficient other evidence to show guilt.
In Thomas, voluntariness was much more debatable. The
accused, a twenty-seven-year-old veteran with a partial high
school education, was twice lassoed around the neck by a posse
member. On both occasions, the sheriff immediately removed
the rope. No other mistreatment was recorded. The next day,
over twenty hours after the roping, the defendant confessed.
The Court, by a five-to-four vote, upheld the conviction. Jus-
tice Clark wrote the opinion, holding that "the undisputed
facts before us do not show that petitioner's oral statement was
a product of fear engendered by them."7 Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan dissented without
opinion.
These five 1957 Term decisions show a Court that contin-
ued to have a healthy respect for the rights of blacks, four years
after Brown v. Board of Education.0 In four of the five cases,
the rights of blacks were upheld by a unanimous vote or strong
majority; the sole case decided against a black defendant was
by a bare majority of five votes. It is particularly interesting
that the Court accepted only five cases involving blacks in the
Term. The Court may have desired to retreat from the issue
until public attacks on the desegregation decisions eased. Per-
haps the lower courts had understood the high Court's message
and attempted to solve problems before they reached the Su-
preme Court. In any case, the violent reaction of Congress and
the public to the activist role the Warren Court was playing in
attempting to integrate the schools' did not lead to any retreat
in the protection of blacks in the cases decided in the 1957
Term.
78. 356 U.S. at 567.
79. 356 U.S. at 400.
80. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
81. Supreme Court: A Critical Look by State Justices, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REP., Aug. 29, 1958, at 62-63.
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VICTORY FOR NEITHER BLOC
Throughout this comment, evidence has been presented
documenting a dynamic polarization within the Court. The
Court's high degree of disagreement spread over the entire
Term and affected every subject area. Over half the decisions
rendered were polarized.82 Two additional inquiries into the
empirical data are helpful in further understanding the 1957
Term: 1) a study of opinion assignments by the Justices, and
2) a determination as to which bloc prevailed the greatest num-
ber of times during the Term.
The Supreme Court is often viewed as a group of persons
who pass judgments on cases collectively. But as the late Jus-
tice Robert Jackson once noted, "The fact is that the Court
functions less as one deliberative body than as nine."' The
truth of this statement becomes even more apparent as the
individual Justices' opinion assignments in each subject area
are presented. Below, in Table 1, each member's 1957 opinions
are set forth. The upper left triangle contains the number of
opinions the Justice wrote in that area; while the bottom right
gives the number of those opinions that were polarized. Justice
Harlan's opinion assignments in the area of constitutional law
may be taken as an example. He wrote five opinions in the
area; three of which were polarized. The far right column holds
the totals for each Justice, and the bottom line contains the
summary in each substantive area.
The table suggests some interesting patterns. The core
conservative members (Frankfurter, Burton and Harlan) wrote
majority opinions in thirty-two cases; twenty-six were polar-
ized. The core liberal bloc (Warren, Black and Douglas) wrote
majority opinions in thirty-six cases; only fifteen were polar-
ized. Justice Brennan, considered in this article to be quite
possibly a second-swing Justice, wrote majority opinions in
ten cases; only four were polarized.
Clearly, the conservatives were more active in writing
opinions when voting splits occurred. One interesting sidelight
is that Justice Clark, in a swing position, wrote nine of his
fifteen opinions in polarized cases, indicating that both blocs
used him as the moderate to ease the impact of many decisions.
82. Fifty-seven out of a total of 104 cases for a 57% polarization rate.
83. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 10
(1954).
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TABLE 1
Opinions of Admin. Admi- B -. C it. & Crio. Con. Juris.& Labor Tax Justice.
the Court Lao raty g. Aliens Law Law Prued. Law Lawe Totals
1 2 3 13 10
Frankfurter ZX x 0390
ara2 2 4 5 1 1 15





l0.. //. /2 /0,J 1 9Brennan 2 /46%
Warren
Douglas 1 0 6
Black 1/ /
Subject Area 6 7 57% 
Totals 2 3 0 2 1 1 1 5 '2
This figure includes Chief Justice Warren's announcement of the majority opinion in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958). Only one other Justice joined in the opinion.
In determining which voting bloc prevailed, only polarized
cases with a five-to-four or six-to-three split were considered.
As Table 2, below, shows, of the fifty decisions that were con-
sidered, 84 the core conservative bloc prevailed in twenty-four of
the cases and the core liberal bloc in twenty-six.
The results show that when the Term is considered in its
entirety neither camp could claim victory. In fact, the number
of decisions claimed for each side is so close that in only two
areas can it be said that the views of one bloc prevailed even
slightly. The liberal bloc appears to have prevailed in the area
of citizenship and aliens5 and the conservative bloc in matters
relating to criminal procedure .8 However, it can be noted that
84. Nine seven-to-two decisions were not included, but were polarized. Likewise
two six-to-three decisions were not included because they were not polarized.
85. The liberal bloc prevailed in seven of the ten decisions rendered.
86. Of thirteen decisions rendered, the conservative bloc won eight.




Categories bloc prevailed bloc prevailed
Administrative Law (1 decision) 0 1
Admiralty Law (2) 0 2
Business Regulation (6) 3 3
ICC (2) 0 2
Citizenship and Aliens (10) 3 7
Criminal Law (13) 8 5
Constitutional Law (7) 4 3
Jurisdiction and Procedure (4) 2 2
Labor Law (4) 3 1
Taxation Law (1) 1 0
Totals (50 decisions) 24 26
(48%) (52%0)
the "abatement of the liberal trend" 7 emerged late in the Term
and thus would not be reflected fully in the above table.
Nevertheless, the data show the high disagreement among
the Justices and the ideological differences between the two
blocs in each of the sabstantive areas.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the behavior of the United States Supreme
Court within different categories of cases decided in the Octo-
ber 1957 Term provides historical insight into the issues the
highly polarized Court found itself struggling to resolve. Al-
though voting statistics were used as a starting point, the goal
of this comment has been to go beyond the statistical data and
understand how the Court was reacting to the particular issues
it faced.
The project began with the assumption that polarization
during the 1957 Term would be found primarily in certain sen-
87. Galloway, supra note 3, at 950-51.
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sitive areas which had become the targets of public concern
and protest. This assumption proved to be only partly correct.
The most highly polarized area was one in which strong public
protest had occurred, namely loyalty oath/subversion cases.
Similarly, above average polarization was present in the sensi-
tive criminal procedure area. On the other hand, several unex-
pected patterns were found. First, decisions in the highly explo-
sive race area were much more unanimous than those in other
areas. The Court adhered to its general pro-black stance with
relatively little disagreement. Second, above-average polari-
zation occurred in several areas considered to be less sensitive:
labor and trade regulation. Third, some evidence of polarized
bloc voting was found in each of the areas studied, indicating
that the polarization was much broader than expected.
"The true test of any mode of research or technique of
analysis is the degree to which it increases understanding or
yields solutions to important problems."88 This comment hope-
fully is such an experiment. "8 The High Court's polarization
throughout the late 1950's is best understood against the back-
drop of sensitive issues and differences in judicial philosophy
among its different members. The 1957 Term served as a high
water mark for these disagreements and laid the foundation for
the judicial restraint that was to come in the Terms to follow.
Stephen D. Pahl
88. MURPHY & PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES AND Pouiics 700 (2d ed. 1974).
89. Other studies which have thoroughly explored this area by similar methodol-
ogies are: Ulmer, Toward a Theory of Subgroup Formation in the United States Su-
preme Court, 27 J. OF PoLrTCs 133 (1963); Synder, The Supreme Court as a Small
Group, 36 SOCIAL FORCES 232 (1958); See generally: C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT
COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES (1948).
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APPENDIX
Decisions rendered in the October, 1957 Term
(Polarized decisions are indicated by italics)
CITIZENSHIP AND ALIENS
Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
Heikkinen v. United States, 355 U.S. 273 (1958).
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958).
Maisenberg v. United States, 356 U.S. 670 (1958).
Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691 (1958).
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958).
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
Rogers v. Quan, 357 U.S. 193 (1958).
LABOR RELATIONS
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
NLRB v. District 50, United Mine Workers of America, 355
U.S. 453 (1958).
NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342
(1958).
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617
(1958).
International Union (UA WCIO) v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357
U.S. 93 (1958).
NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958).
United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570 (1958).
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
1004 [Vol. 19
A COURT DIVIDED
Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958).
Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958).
Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
BUSINESS REGULATION AND FEDERAL AGENCIES (Hybrid category)
Black v. Magnolia Liquor Co., 355 U.S. 24 (1957).
United States v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 355
U.S. 253 (1957).
Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vance, 355 U.S. 389 (1958).
FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958).
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. Producers Livestock Market-
ing Ass'n, 356 U.S. 282 (1958).
Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481
(1958).
Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590 (1958).
United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595 (1958).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
United States v. Shotwell Manufacturing Co., 355 U.S. 233
(1957).
United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S 604 (1958).
United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958).
Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 357 U.S. 77
(1958).
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United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155
(1958).
Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426 (1958).
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. County of Los Ange-
les, 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Partial category; excludes ICC, tax,
labor)
PUC of California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958).
NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co., 357 U.S. 1 (1958).
Lewis v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 10 (1958).
McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 357 U.S. 265
(1958).
Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958).
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
Schaffer Transportation Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83
(1957).
American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 355 U.S. 141
(1957).
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R.R. v. Illinois, 355
U.S. 300 (1958).
Nelson, Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 554 (1958).
County of Marin v. United States, 356 U.S. 412 (1958).
PUC of Utah v. United States, 356 U.S. 421 (1958).
ADMIRALTY AND RAILROADS
Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355
U.S. 563 (1958).
Alaska Industrial Board v. Chugach Electric Ass'n, 356 U.S.
320 (1958).
Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 356 U.S. 326 (1958).
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
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TAX
Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958).
Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
Fidelity-Philadephia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274 (1958).
Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958).
United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63 (1958).
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958).
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958).

